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adopting a conciliar form of government for the proposed church. Despite the enactment of many resolutions calling for ecclesiastical independence, little real progress was made during 1917, primarily because other matters of a more immediate nature, especially the agrarian problem and the demand for peace, absorbed public attention. Among other obstacles there was the hesitancy of many priests to challenge the established religious order and the lack of forthright support from the Ukrainian Central Council *(Ukrainska Central'na Rada)* which was the recognized representative body attempting to govern Ukraine at the time.

When the government of the Central Council was replaced by that of Hetman Paul Skoropads'kyj in April of 1918 the official attitude toward the organization of a separate church became more sympathetic. A Ministry of Religious Cults was established under the direction of Professor Basil Zin'kivs'kyj, a philosopher and psychologist who taught at the University of Kiev. Plans were made to convoke a *sobor*, or general church conclave, but before this could be done it was necessary to select a new metropolitan archbishop of Kiev to succeed Metropolitan Vladimir, who had been murdered in February while the city was under Bolshevik rule. According to established procedure the metropolitan was to be elected at a diocesan congress, but Zin'kivs'kyj wished to depart from this practice and have all of the Ukrainian dioceses participate in the electoral meeting. His reason for making this request was that the Metropolitan of Kiev is regarded as the ranking hierarch in Ukraine and not merely as the head of another diocese.

However, the Church administration, which was in Russian hands at the time, proceeded to call an ordinary congress of the Kiev diocese thus ignoring Zin'kivs'kyj's proposal. In view of the nature of the Congress' membership it is not surprising that Metropolitan Anthony Khrapovits'kyj of Kharkov was elected. This did not please the Ukrainian nationalists because Anthony had forbidden the clergy of the Kharkov diocese to read the Gospel in Ukrainian, which he termed "a language of the market place." Zin'kivs'kyj wrote in vain to His Holiness Tikhon, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, requesting that Anthony's election be set aside. The new Metropolitan immediately made plans for his journey to Kiev with the intention of arriving there in the morning, but railway workers, who were aware of the hierarch's anti-nationalist views, delayed the train for nearly ten hours and prevented a ceremonial welcome planned by his supporters.[8]

The German-sponsored Skoropads'kyj Government continued to lend its support to the convocation of the All-Ukrainian *Sobor*

[8] Dmytro Dorošenko, *Istorija Ukrainy* (Užhorod, 1930), II, 322.

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which met on June 20. Metropolitan Anthony as senior bishop was elected to the honorary presidency of the *Sobor*, but Bishop Pimen of the Balta diocese presided over the sessions. A national church did not emerge from these meetings because its adherents controlled no more than a third of the votes. The *Sobor* contented itself with requesting the Government to recognize Anthony as Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, which meant that it wished to have the parishes in Ukraine remain part of the Russian Orthodox Church. On July 9, it enacted a statute for the provisional administration of the Church in Ukraine which granted to the Patriarch of Moscow the right to confirm the election of the Metropolitan of Kiev, hear complaints directed against him and other Ukrainian bishops, bless the convocation of Ukrainian *sobors*, and be prayed for in the performance of every liturgical office in every Ukrainian parish. In effect, the statute provided for autonomy and not the autocephalous status which the nationalist clergy desired.

The statute also conferred upon Patriarch Tikhon of Moscow the right to reject any of its provisions, and the head of the Russian Church did not hesitate to do so. In a letter written to Metropolitan Anthony on September 26, 1918, the Patriarch expressed his willingness to accept the statute, but only if the Orthodox dioceses in Ukraine were to remain "an inseparable part of the one Russian Orthodox Church" on an autonomous basis, and accept decisions of the All-Russian Church *Sobors*. He also insisted upon the right to send his own representative to Ukrainian *sobors* and confirm the ruling hierarch in every Ukrainian diocese.[4] The Patriarch's conditions were not calculated to endear him to the advocates of a national church. Their dissatisfaction found expression in the address which Hetman Skoropads'kyj's new Minister of Cults, Alexander Lotoc'kyj (1870–1939), delivered before the All-Ukrainian *Sobor* on November 12, when it reconvened in Kiev. In no uncertain terms he attacked the Patriarch's autocratic methods and flatly stated that the Government favored an autocephalous church for Ukraine.

However, the conflict remained unresolved because of the collapse of Hetman Skoropads'kyj's regime as a result of the withdrawal of the German army of occupation in conformity with the armistice provisions which had been negotiated in the West. As the Germans withdrew, the Red Army invaded Ukraine and attacked the newly-organized armed forces of the Directory Government, the troops commanded by Symon Petljura. Many of the members of this new Government which succeeded that of Skoropads'kyj were republican socialists who had been prominent in the Central Council *(Rada)* of 1917. While many of these men were secularists

[4] *Ibid.*; Appendix 11 contains the text of the Patriarch's letter.

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795 659 and opposed to the perpetuation of the close relationship between Church and State which had existed under the Hetman's regime, they nevertheless thought it best to recognize the autocephalous status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and did so in a law enacted on January 2, 1919. In the two years of anarchy and civil war which followed, little could be done to further the actual establishment of the Church. The Directory Government's diplomatic envoy in Constantinople, Alexander Lotoc'kyj, attempted in vain to obtain recognition of the Church by the *locum tenens* of the Constantinople Patriarchate in order to assure its canonical status. Metropolitan Dorofej, who was serving as *locum tenens* at the time, refused to decide on recognition, since he was convinced that only a patriarch could take such a step.[5] Lotoc'kyj's efforts had been hampered in Constantinople by the émigré Russian hierarchs, including Metropolitan Anthony and Metropolitan Platon of Odessa, who had found refuge there from the Bolsheviks. They ultimately established themselves as the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad with headquarters in the Yugoslav city of Sremski-Karlovtsi. Their departure from Ukraine, however, meant that the opposition to the national church would be diminished to a slight degree.

795 Thus in 1920 there commenced to function effectively in Kiev an All-Ukrainian Church Council which was a synod composed of priests and deacons. It had the task of promoting the organization of parishes for the new Church and also served as its highest administrative organ. The Russian bishops whom Metropolitan Anthony had left in charge prior to his departure expressed their opposition to this Ukrainian "sectarianism" and forbade the members of the Ukrainian Church Council to celebrate the liturgy. However, the new Church retained control of four of the largest houses of worship in Kiev, including historic St. Sophia's Cathedral, and held the usual Eastern Orthodox religious offices, but conducted them in the Ukrainian language instead of in the archaic and not easily understood Church Slavonic which is the liturgical medium of the Russian Church. Other parishes left the Russian Church and attached themselves to the Ukrainian Church Council, and it soon became evident that this new branch of Eastern Orthodoxy would have to obtain its own episcopate. No bishop of the Russian Church was willing to join the Ukrainians, and when they requested several of them to consecrate two Ukrainian priests as bishops they met with refusals. It was in such an atmosphere of frustration that the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church *Sobor* convened in the Cathedral of St. Sophia on October 14, 1921.

The *Sobor*, in a final, futile attempt to seek a reconciliation with

[5] Alexander Lotoc'kyj, *V. Carhorodi* (Warsaw, 1939), pp. 92 f.

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of greater magnitude or requires more Grace than the other six sacraments which are performed by all priests.

It is claimed that the differentiation which now exists between a bishop and presbyter or priest lies not in the degree or quality of Grace which each enjoys, but only in the functions which each performs. Yet when the Ukrainian Orthodox Church re-established itself in 1921, it did not abolish the episcopacy or argue in a presbyterian manner that the episcopacy has no place in the Church. It merely argued that the exclusive right of bishops to administer the sacrament of holy orders (ordination and consecration) developed as a result of the actual needs of Church life and not on the grounds that bishops possess a greater degree or higher quality of Grace. The Church itself, it is contended, is the source of the differentiation in functions performed by bishops and presbyters or priests. Administrative necessity and the need for unity and stability alone caused the Church to grant to bishops the exclusive right to ordain and consecrate. This right is a purely canonical matter and is therefore, unlike religious dogma, not immutable. It is a practice developed by the Church, and it is consequently possible for the Church to redistribute functions at any time, as its Ukrainian branch did in 1921 when it became necessary to obtain a truly Ukrainian episcopate. This was a drastic step, and it was accompanied by an appeal to the Lord, the Supreme Pastor, before whom the Ukrainians laid their faith, hopes, and prayers.[14]

Under Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj's leadership thirty-five bishops were consecrated in the traditional Orthodox manner, and the new Church appeared to be prospering. The Soviet Government had done little to prevent its establishment but within a few years commenced a campaign of gradual suppression. In 1924 and during each of the three succeeding years Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj was placed under arrest. In 1927 he was compelled to resign and a *sobor* elected Nicholas Borec'kyj to succeed him. The new Metropolitan governed the Church until 1930 when it was implicated in the alleged plot of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (*Spilka Vyzvolennja Ukrainy*). This clandestine organization was accused of promoting separatist tendencies and desiring to restore private property. Vladimir Čekhivs'kyj, a Social Democrat who had been premier of the anti-Bolshevik Directory Government early in 1919, was charged with having headed the Union's religious section. During the trial of the forty-five leaders of the Union in March and April

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 100 f. Archbishop Teodorovyč (pp. 124 ff.) has cited considerable evidence which indicates that consecration of bishops by a college of presbyters was a practice employed by the Church of Alexandria for more than two centuries preceding the convocation of the First Ecumenical Council in 325 A.D.

of 1930 the prosecution alleged that the Church held secret requiems for Symon Petljura, the émigré nationalist, following his murder in Paris.[15] The Ukrainian Church never recovered from the setback which it suffered as a result of the trial. During the 1930's all of the bishops were arrested, and with the advent of World War II there remained only Archbishop Teodorovyč in the United States, the sole surviving hierarch of the original thirty-five.[16]

The opportunity to renew the autocephalous status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church came with the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. The movement was headed by Bishop Polikarp Sikors'kyj of the diocese of Lutsk in Volynia, who in February of 1942 re-established the Church at a *sobor* in Pinsk and consecrated several bishops. At the same time Bishop Polikarp succeeded in obtaining the support of his nominal superior, Metropolitan Dionisij of Warsaw, who had consecrated him in 1932 and ten years later elevated him to an archbishopric. Polikarp's consecration had been canonical since he had headed part of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Poland, which was recognized by the Patriarch of Constantinople during the inter-war period. Thus the renewed Ukrainian Church was not plagued with the charge of "self-consecration" which served the enemies of the national church so well during the

[15] Nicholas Kovalevs'kyj, *Ukraina Pid Červonyin Jarmom* (Lviv, 1936), pp. 72 ff.

[16] The demise of the Church in Ukraine itself did not hinder the development of independent Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in the United States and in Canada. Many of the Ukrainian immigrants in both countries desired such a Church, and when the movement first manifested itself in the homeland they were quick to assume the initiative. As early as July 18, 1918, a group of 150 laymen held a church congress in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. The participants were members of the Uniat Church, adhering to the Eastern Orthodox ritual but acknowledging the Papacy, who were dissatisfied with the arbitrary nature of its administration and the principle of personal episcopal ownership of all church buildings and parochial property. They also objected to the attempt of the Uniat Church to obtain control of the Peter Mohyla Institute, a Ukrainian educational institution in Saskatoon. When the Uniat bishop denied them the sacraments, they decided to establish a truly national and democratically governed church and return to the Orthodox faith of their forefathers. The new Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada gained adherents from the Russian Orthodox Church which lost whole parishes composed of emigrants from Bukovina; many Uniats also joined the new Church which now has more than two hundred congregations although many of these are rural and small. The Canadian Church, unlike the movement in Ukraine itself, succeeded in obtaining recognition from a canonically consecrated Orthodox hierarch in the United States, the Syrian Metropolitan Germanos, who served as its acting bishop until Archbishop Teodorovyč succeeded him in 1924. The latter also assumed control over the numerically smaller Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, but in 1947 he relinquished the leadership of the Canadian Church which now has a separate hierarch. It is significant that the Canadian Church did not accept the canons which were adopted at the Kiev *Sobor* in 1921, since it wished to be in a position to establish relations with the other branches of the Orthodox Church on the North American continent.

659 795 The spread of Protestantism from Germany to Ukraine was favored by the mere geographical fact of the latter's inclusion in the Polish empire while Poland, as a result of its close connections with Prussia, the Baltic States and Bohemia was for a considerable time a refuge for all sorts of creeds. Moreover, many of the magnates and some of the kings of Poland had shown themselves to be favorably disposed to the new movement, not indeed from any genuine, religious feeling, nor because they were moved by conscience to adopt new ways, but purely from motives of self-interest; for they calculated that, if the reformation was victorious in Poland, the Catholic Church would forfeit its all-powerful influence on life in general and, further, they hoped to acquire for themselves the enormous property which the Catholic Church would have to abandon. Such reasoning, however, did not apply to the Orthodox Church which had little property and which did not constitute a power that was ambitious of yielding political influence; it was inspired by no desire for sovereignty, but, on the contrary, had constantly to defend itself against encroachments from without.

795 The same trends and sympathy for the West gave rise to the movement for the union of the churches whose leaders did not think only of their personal interest but were also inspired by lofty ideals. When, after the fall of Constantinople, Moscow or the third Rome, as it liked to be called, tried to succeed to the position of capital of the Eastern Church, the Ukrainian bishops were faced with a choice between a Moscow that they held to be still uncivilised and Rome, a center of Western culture, and they decided in favor of the latter.

From the point of view of national interests, the dignitaries who joined the Union represented definitely Ukrainian tendencies in contrast to their conservative colleagues who preferred a connection with Moscow which was also orthodox. In support of this contention we may mention that the Metropolitan Hipatius Potij, a Greek Catholic who was one of the most energetic champions of the Union, displayed particular zeal for the Ukrainian language in which tongue he recited his creed and took his oath to the Pope, although he was completely at home in Latin. By accepting the protection of the mighty Church

655 firms were turned into branches of one commissariat or another. By the spring, while there had not yet been a full communization of the country, the process was well advanced and no resident of Western Ukraine could doubt as to the future of the area.

659 In Eastern Galicia, where the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite was the predominant religion, the Metropolitan Archbishop Andry Sheptytsky was not personally touched.[1] He was placed under more or less surveillance and found it impossible to exercise his normal activity. However, all the religious schools and seminaries under his charge were closed, the church and monastic lands were seized, and all ecclesiastical printing was suppressed. Finally, the clergy were compelled to hand over to the representatives of the government all the baptismal and other records which were incorporated in the work of the ZATS, the Soviet bureau of vital statistics. The clergy were treated as a non-working class [661] and were thus deprived of all means of livelihood, except for the free-will offerings of their impoverished parishioners.

In the eastern sections, where the Orthodox Church predominated, the same regulations were put into force with the additional proviso that the clergy had to transfer their allegiance from the Polish Orthodox Church to the locum tenens of the Russian Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow. This was a first step in improving relations between the locum tenens and the Soviet government and in making the authorities of the Russian Orthodox Church a definite instrument of the government in the spreading of Russian Communism.

545 On the other hand, there was a considerable patronage of Ukrainian art. Certain scholars were rather favored. The Ukrainian theatre was supported on a more liberal scale than it had been under the Polish rule and there were in some quarters hopes that there might be a happy future. It was again a short dream, for [626] as 1940 came to a close, there began again the insistant but unobtrusive attempts at russification. Russian theatrical companies began to visit Lviv and other cities. The publications of the publishing firms of Lviv fell off and once more they found it necessary to produce Russian books. The libraries were carefully purged of

[1] [1940 -- under Russian occupation -- Analyst]

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CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

The Soviet Religious Policy

000 In any discussion of Soviet Russian-Ukrainian relations, the religious problem is important for it touches many issues which are but dimly understood in the Western world. The latter has been too long content to think of the east of Europe only in terms of power politics, the Eastern Question, and similar problems to bother about the details of a discussion which has been often a matter of life and death to the people involved and which might throw a real light upon the present situation.

795 One fact stands out. Rus'-Ukraine was Christianized before
● 659 the division of the Eastern and Western Churches and the full results of that division were not made evident until the dawn of the modern era. The dominant religious type of religion was that of the Orthodox East and the important See was that of Kiev. Yet Kievan Christianity was never bigoted or exclusive and even after the great Schism of 1054, the princes of Kiev continued to intermarry equally with the noble families of both east and west.

After the Metropolitan, under political pressure, took up his residence in Moscow, Kiev and the Western Ukrainian lands secured a new Metropolitan from the Patriarch of Constantinople. Moscow became the seat of a patriarchate but it was only in 1648 that the Patriarch and the Tsar of Moscow became willing to have any contact with the Orthodox Christians of Kiev. Already in 1596 this attitude had culminated in the establishment of a Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite, acknowledging the papacy but maintaining the Eastern Orthodox forms of worship.

In 1686, while the Tsar of Russia was beginning to absorb the Zaporozhian Kozaks, he exerted pressure upon the Patriarch of Constantinople to abolish this new Metropolitanate of Kiev, and in 1686, by the act of Moscow but not of Constantinople, this was done. Once Moscow secured control, it applied the

795 659 Muscovite usages and as its power grew in Ukraine, so did its pretensions. The cultural power of Ukrainian Orthodoxy disappeared in the Russian Sea, while the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite became the dominating religious power in Western Ukraine. Nothing shows more clearly the Muscovite attitude than the fact that it gave a lower rank to the Metropolitan of Kiev than it did to the head of the Georgian Orthodox, when they, too, passed under Russian sovereignty.

As Rus'-Ukraine under tsarist control became only a collection of "Little Russian" gubernias, so the Ukrainian Orthodox became a collection of "Little Russian" diocess, in which there was nothing Ukrainian and so it remained until 1917, while each time that the tsar acquired more Ukrainian lands, the same form of coercion was applied not only to the Ukrainian Orthodox but also to the Catholics whose Byzantine Rite under the Hapsburgs and then under Poland and Czechoslovakia, had developed into a distinct Western Ukrainian religion. Under the leadership of Metropolitan Andry Sheptytsky, a giant physically and intellectually, this process went on rapidly, much to the annoyance of the Poles in the old province of Eastern Galicia.

Finally we must note that when Western Ukraine passed under Poland in 1920, that country forced the establishment of a Polish Orthodox Church for the several million Ukrainians and Byelorussians who were in the revived state. The language of this was Polish and its organization was adopted to the Polish system as it developed in the revived state.

With these preliminary notes, we can now turn to the relations between the Ukraine and the Soviet Russians.

A. The Orthodox

With the Revolution of 1917 and the revival and development of the independence movement among the Ukrainians, there arose also a demand for the revival of an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church. This was stubbornly opposed by the Provisional Government, Patriarch Tikhon and the Russian Orthodox in Ukraine, the same forces that had haggled and debated the develop-

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ment of a Ukrainian independent state throughout the period, until the Russian Communists secured control and were able to maintain their assumption of power.

In the first stages, while the Communists still hoped for the success of the world revolution, they emphasized their doctrines of atheism and they stressed the conception that "religion was the opium of the people." At the same time they endeavored to disintegrate the Russian Orthodox Church from within by giving their support to the various schemes of reform as the Living Church, etc. They also gave especial favor to various Protestant bodies, as the Baptists, who sought to introduce their ideas, often with marked success.

It was a crucial period for eastern Europe, for the Western nations and America which had been victorious in World War I were not inclined to cement their victory. No matter what they thought of the Communist regime, Great Britain and the United States were still convinced that the victory of a democratic Russia was a certainty and they refused to take any steps to help the non-Russian peoples who were being over-whelmed by the Soviets, lest it prejudice their future relations with Russia. France, obsessed with the fear of Germany, was seeking to restore a greater Poland which would absorb as much as possible of Ukraine. The memory of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk blinded everybody to events as they were taking place.

It was no less critical for the Patriarch of Constantinople. The Allies sympathized with his position but the successful revolt of Mustapha Kemal against the Treaty of Sèvres produced a situation where the Western powers had to fight or surrender. They wished to do neither and with a certain Bolshevik sympathy for Turkey, the Patriarch was obliged to be cautious, until his hands were in a way freed by the settlement of Lausanne.

Hence the leaders of the movement for a Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church were in a way powerless to regulate their relations with Orthodoxy as a whole. They had been unable to secure the support and assistance of any Russian bishops. They

the Church flourished and bade fair to restore the traditions of the old Ukrainian Orthodox Church and there were high hopes that sooner or later it would be able to heal the defects in the original consecration. 795

This was not to be, for after the death of the Patriarch Tikhon the power in the Russian Church passed into the hands of the Metropolitan Sergy who showed himself willing to effect such a compromise with Stalin and Communism as might be necessary. His offer was, to a certain degree, accepted and the Soviet regime, without changing its policy of persecuting all religious activity, began to throw a few crumbs of favor to the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate in Moscow. Slowly but surely, the various Russian divisions, like the Living Church, slipped back into the general organization, and the Soviets soon grasped the possibilities of using Sergy and the Russian organization as a political weapon in their struggle for world domination. 795 659

Even before the ending of Ukrainization, the Communists began to put obstacles in the way of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. The Metropolitan was refused permission to visit the various parishes under his control and to publish journals and other material for his flock. This was followed by more active measures. Metropolitan Lypkivsky was arrested and imprisoned. So were all of the other bishops and by 1930 there was not a single one of the bishops still in Ukraine who was not in prison or dead. The church was broken up and all of its activities stopped, but the spirit that had animated it continued to lie hidden.

When the Germans and the Soviets occupied Poland in 1939, a new possibility was sensed. The so-called Polish Autocephalous Church was composed overwhelmingly of Ukrainians and Byelorussians, with but a few anti-Communist Russians. Even before 1939, some of these Ukrainian clergy and laity had begun to take steps for the Ukrainianizing of the Church, even though they had been forced to introduce Polish into the services. When the storm broke, Russians like Bishop Sava made their way abroad and joined the Russians in exile. Bishop Oleksy (Hromadsky) in Kremyanets and Bishop Polykarp (Sikorsky) in Lutsk were forced 795 [793]

795 to recognize the Moscow organization, which was coming into favor with Stalin because of its increasing subservience to the Soviet regime. On the other hand, Metropolitan Dionysy, who had been in that part of Ukraine that was included in the Polish Government General, now threw off any attempt at concealment and revived the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, which this time was provided with canonical orders in all grades. He consecrated two new Ukrainian bishops, Ilarion (O. Ohienko) for Kholm and Podlyasie and Palady (Vedybida-Rudemko) for Krakow and Lemkivshchyna.

This marked a new period and when the Germans attacked the USSR in 1941 and occupied it, Polykarp joined them, while Oleksy set up still another group, the Ukrainian Autonomous Church, for he refused to break his connections with Moscow.

795 659 [727] The German permission for the formation in 1942 of a central organization was frankly ambiguous. On the one hand, they were glad of any movement that would rouse the people against Moscow. On the other, in religion as in politics, they were opposed to any movement which would prevent them from carrying out their policy of treating the Ukrainians as a subject and inferior race. As a result, they put every obstacle in the way of a reconciliation between the Autocephalous and the Autonomous groups and threw their support to whichever was the weaker in any given area.

The open support of the Soviet government by Sergy and his associates now under the pressure of war paid off. His protestations of sympathy for Stalin and the Russians were rewarded with medals and other honors. Then, in the autumn of 1943, as the final step in the process, Stalin gave permission for the restoration of the Patriarchate in Moscow and Sergy was duly installed. On his death in 1944, he was succeeded by Aleksey, the former Archbishop of Leningrad, the present Patriarch, and under his leadership the Russian Orthodox Church has embarked upon a policy of securing control for the Soviets of all other Orthodox Churches.

795 In the meanwhile, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church during the war displayed great activity in the occupied Ukraine. It speedily won the support of most of the clergy who were not in

795 in the attempt to revive a native and independent Ukrainian
793 government. This was, of course, prevented by the Germans and the Archbishop remained at Lviv scarcely more free during the German occupation of Ukraine than he had been under the Soviets. He continued his efforts to unite both the Ukrainian Catholic and Autocephalous Churches without effect, but he was able to do considerable for the well-being of his people. Still he was no longer free to act openly, although his advice was sought whenever and wherever it could be.

The Soviets reoccupied Lviv on July 27, 1944 and at once set to work more vigorously to introduce their system. Archbishop Sheptytsky did not long survive for he passed away on November 1 of the same year. He was succeeded in his post by Joseph Slipy, who had been one of his outstanding assistants and the rector of the Theological Academy which Metropolitan Sheptytsky had founded in the late twenties, when it had became evident that the Poles would not allow the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lviv.

659 Metropolitan Slipy had barely been installed in office, when
795 the Soviets showed their hand and began to call for a condemnation
793 of the Vatican by the Ukrainian Catholics and for their union
661 with Moscow. It did not take long for words to turn into actions.

On April 15, 1945, the NKVD surrounded the Cathedral of St. George in Lviv and arrested the Metropolitan, Bishop Budko and Bishop Charnetsky together with many other leaders. They arrested all of the students of the Theological Academy and they likewise seized the Cathedral and turned it over to the Patriarch of Moscow as a Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time, they informed the professors of the Theological Seminary that the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite had ceased to exist.

At almost the same time the NKVD gathered in the other Catholic bishops in Western Ukraine, Bishop Khomyshyn of Stanislaviv and his vicar, Bishop Lyatyshevsky, while at the same time the Polish Communist regime seized Bishop Kotsylovsky of Pere-

myshl and his auxiliary bishop, Lakota. Bishops Khomyshyn and Kotsylovsky soon died under the treatment that they received.

The others were kept in prison and then in 1946, according to the best available information, Metropolitan Slipy and his associates were sent to labor camps in the far north in the Vorkuta coal mines. From that time they have disappeared from sight.

In 1947, the last Catholic bishop of this rite, Bishop Romzha of Carpatho-Ukraine, while travelling through his diocese "collided" accidentally with a Soviet tank and was killed and this ended the Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy in their own lands. The following year the Rumanian government followed suit and likewise annihilated the hierarchy of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite in Transylvania. In 1950 the Czech Communist regime arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment Bishop Hoydych and his coadjutor Hopka of the diocese of Prashev in Slovakia.

These actions were followed in each case by attacks upon the lower clergy, who were ordered to accept the supremacy of the Patriarch of Moscow. This was fully in the tradition of the old Russian Church, for each time that the tsars had bitten off a slice of Ukraine, they had applied the same methods to the Catholic hierarchy in the section, to the intent that the Byzantine rite could be performed only under the supervision of the Russian authorities.

In this case in 1945, on July 1, when the Soviet Ukrainian Commissar for Religion, Khodchenko, called on the clergy to recognize the new situation, the professors of the Theological Academy met in Lviv in the Cathedral of St. George and presented a request that they be given the liberties accorded to them on paper by the Stalinist Constitution. The answer was their arrest and imprisonment.

Then the government set to work. They secured the apostasy of one of the foremost of the Ukrainian Catholic priests, Father Kostelnyk, who willingly put himself at the service of the Patriarch and presided over a "sobor" which was called to ratify the switch from the Vatican to the Patriarch. Many of the priests who attended were apparently members of the NKVD in disguise. They willingly applauded Stalin and the Patriarch and armed with this authority,

659 795 793 661 the Soviet regime set to work to seize all the churches and property of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite and preempt it for their own use.

This marked the end of the open existence of the Church. There were still priests who escaped and took refuge with the U. P. A. (the Ukrainian underground) but open worship was at an end. There has been enforced at least a superficial agreement with the Kremlin on all matters of religion. Nevertheless, the latent hatred still exists and it can flare up at any moment when the situation warrants it.

The movements represented by the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite still flourish in the emigration, where alone there is any opportunity for free thought. In the meanwhile, the Kremlin is maintaining its position in its traditional Muscovite manner and applying its savage punishments and deportations and executions to prove that Ukraine is happy and contented in following the example of the "elder brother." Yet even so, the number of episodes when Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism appears make it seem as if the officials of both church and state were not too sure that the Ukrainian people fully sympathize with the Patriarch Aleksey in his deification of the foremost man of the ages, who still forbids Communists to have anything to do with the Orthodox Church. That has sold its soul for as little real value as did the Ukrainian Communists in the early years of the struggle.

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VIII. NATIONALISM AND THE CHURCH

THE PRINCIPAL propagators of Ukrainian nationalism in the occupied Ukraine were political groups. They were, however, not the only bearers of the concept of Ukrainian distinctiveness. Religious organizations also played an important role. The relation of the Greek Catholic Church to the nationalist parties has already been discussed. Unlike the political parties, most of which at least claimed to represent the entire Ukrainian nation, however, the Greek Catholic Church was almost wholly confined to Galicia, since the great mass of the East Ukrainian Christians were members of the Orthodox faith.

In the Orthodox lands, religion and national affiliation have always been closely related. Most of the East and South Slavic peoples identify their church with their national existence. Some of the same characteristics which have enhanced the distinctiveness of these peoples have also formed the basis of divisions among the Orthodox Slavs. One such feature is the lack of a supreme authority within the Orthodox Church. Each body of the church, existing in a given territory in a given period, has a well-defined hierarchy, usually governed by a council of bishops and frequently headed by a patriarch or metropolitan. There is, however, no pope at the head of all Orthodoxy. It is true that the Orthodox Church, like the Roman Catholic Church, recognizes the authority of an ecumenical council, but such a council has not been held in the East for a millennium.

A difficult question arises at this point: how is the "body of the faithful" or "territory" of each group to be defined? This problem has, in fact, been an extremely troublesome one in the history of the Orthodox Church, for in the absence of a central ecclesiastical authority there can be no final solution. In practice an answer has been provided by another characteristic feature

[See category 116, pp. 36-38 -- Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

795 of the Orthodox Church—its close dependence on the secular
659 authority. Historically, the Orthodox Church has been the official church par excellence; union of church and state is not only a legal expression but a vital reality in the history of Eastern Europe. Consequently, the actual extent of authority of each body of the church has usually coincided with the boundaries of the state in which it exists. A corollary of this coincidence of state and ecclesiastical authority has been the establishment of, or the endeavor to establish, a new hierarchical authority whenever a
[668] major change in state sovereignty has taken place. Moreover, as nationalist movements became powerful in the Orthodox lands in the nineteenth century, they often demanded a separate church organization as a consequence of their growing sense of national distinctiveness, and as a preparation for their separate statehood.

795 Until 1917, almost all Orthodox East Slavs were united in a
659 single state, the Russian Empire, with a single church, the Rus-
186 sian Orthodox Church. Since the seventeenth century this church had lacked the customary patriarch or primate, and was connected to the secular power, and to a considerable degree controlled by it through an imperial official, the Procurator of the Holy Synod. The October Revolution destroyed the formal links between these historically intertwined institutions. At this point, the growing strength of Ukrainian national consciousness gave rise to a demand for state independence. It was in accord with the history of Orthodoxy that this demand should have been accompanied by a parallel movement for the establishment of a church organization independent of Moscow, for that seat of ecclesiastical authority had lost its preeminent prestige through the disestablishment of the Russian Orthodox Church, while its role as a symbol of East Slav unity was necessarily repudiated by those who saw the Ukrainian future as distinct from that of Russia.

000 Had the group desiring continuation of the Russian state (whether as an empire or a constitutional democracy) won out, it is probable that ecclesiastical unity would have been restored, since the Russian church, while it lost many of its privileges after the February Revolution, stood to gain in prestige through the reconstitution of the office of Patriarch of Moscow. Had, on the contrary, an independent Ukrainian state been able to maintain

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itself for a few years, very likely a separate Ukrainian hierarchy would have been generally recognized. In the situation which followed from the Bolshevik triumph, neither clear-cut solution was achieved. Instead, a large body of the lower clergy and the faithful split off from the Russian hierarchy in the Ukraine. When no member of the episcopacy could be found to consecrate a new bishop for the dissident group, the Ukrainian church body resorted to the "laying on of hands" by priests as a method for consecrating Father Lypkivs'kyi as prelate of their organization. Thus a new Orthodox Church was formed, which rapidly came to embrace the great majority of organized Orthodox believers in the Ukraine; by 1923 it had no less than three thousand parishes and thirty-five bishops, headed by Lypkivs'kyi, then known as Metropolitan Basil.[1] In spite of this apparent prosperity, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, as it was called, lay under the shadow of two great weaknesses. In the first place, it was not recognized by any other body of the Orthodox Church, for the method of consecration of the new bishops was regarded throughout the Orthodox world as uncanonical, a violation of the essential principle of apostolic succession. From the point of view of the traditional believer, the bishops of the new church were illegitimate; consequently, priests ordained by them (but not those who had joined the Autocephalous Church after ordination by a validly consecrated bishop) were not truly endowed with sacerdotal functions. Secondly, and of more immediate significance, the phenomenal growth of the new church was possible only because of the comparatively indulgent attitude shown by the Communist authorities who, at that time, were more antagonistic to the Russian church than to dissident bodies. When the Soviet power turned to restriction of Ukrainian national activity, as a potential threat to the unity of the USSR, the Autocephalous Church also came under attack. Its entire hierarchy and the great bulk of its clergy were executed or banished in 1929–30.[2]

In view of the close connection between church and state in the Orthodox world, it was only natural that, when the Russian

[1] John S. Reshetar, "Ukrainian Nationalism and the Orthodox Church," *American Slavic and East European Review*, X (February, 1951), 43–45.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

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Empire collapsed and a considerable body of Orthodox believers came under Polish dominion, an effort was made to establish a separate hierarchy in Poland. The leader in this effort was Dionysius, a Russian bishop who, with recognition from the Patriarch of Constantinople, became Metropolitan of Warsaw and head of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Poland.[3] In addition to the Belorussian archbishop of Pinsk, there were four bishops in Volhynia: Archbishop Alexius, with his residence in the famous Pochaïvs'ka Lavra (monastery), and his vicars Polykarp, bishop of Lutsk; Anthony (Martsenko), bishop of Kamen Kashirsk (Kamin Koshyrs'k); and Simon, bishop of Ostriz. These bishops were Ukrainian but subject to Dionysius.[4]

When the Soviet Union acquired Volhynia in September, 1939, its efforts to convert the Russian Orthodox Church into an auxiliary of the Soviet government were already well under way. A special deputy of Patriarch Sergius of Moscow, Nicholas, Exarch of the West Ukraine, was sent to coordinate the church of the newly occupied area with the government-approved ecclesiastical organization. The existing bishops were not deposed, with the exception of Alexander of Pinsk. The latter was not molested physically, but his ecclesiastical jurisdiction, now in the Belorussian Soviet Republic, was divided between a bishop of Brest and a bishop of Pinsk sent from Moscow.[5]

While it is not likely that Alexius or his adherents (including Polykarp) were pleased with the subjugation of their province by Moscow, they appear to have conformed to the Orthodox tradition of submission to the secular power, even when the latter is not basically sympathetic to the Orthodox religion. Although it did not suppress the Orthodox Church, the Soviet government imposed severe restrictions and onerous financial obligations upon it, as well as upon the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia. As a result, many of the priests fled, or took up secular occupations.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 48; Stepan Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 28, 1941, p. 1.

[4] *UAPTs (Ukrainskaia Avtokefalnaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov')* (UAPTs [Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church]), by "A. V." (Pravoslavnyi Beloruss, 1951; mimeographed), p. 2; cf. Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 28, 1941, p. 1. There was also a Bishop Timothy (Shreter) in a monastery in the Generalgouvernement, but he played no role in the controversies which followed, and appears to have been burned to death when Germans destroyed his monastery (Occ E-4 [1]).

[5] Occ E-4 (1); *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 27, 1941, p. 3.

186 The development of Ukrainian political and cultural life in
665 Austria had a great influence on the Ukrainians condemned to ruthless Russification under Tsarist rule. When the first modern Ukrainian political organisation in Tsarist Russia, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, was founded in 1900 (from 1905 this party was named Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party) its first publication *Independent Ukraine* was printed in Austria, in Bukovina.

86 The Ukrainian patriots under Tsarist Russian Government,
668 morally and materially supported the fight of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina for their national rights; these territories were a Ukrainian Piedmont. For not even the revolution of 1905 gave the Ukrainians in Russia their national rights. Of course, the Ukrainians had their deputies in the Russian 'Duma' who demanded autonomy for Ukraine. But the Ukrainian language was not admitted in the schools, the rights of the Ukrainian press were restricted, and active Ukrainians were persecuted by the Russian authorities. Among the Ukrainians in Russia the fight of the Austrian Ukrainians for the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lviw roused great interest. The Russian Government regarded the creation of a Ukrainian University in Galicia as a great danger for the 'indivisible Russia' and sought an agreement with the Polish nationalists in Galicia against the Ukrainian movement. The Russian nationalists regarded the opening of a Ukrainian University in Lviw as a 'casus belli' for Russia against Austria.

668 The Russian Government closely watched the Ukrainian move-
661 ment in Austria and was much alarmed by its successes. In consequence, the Petersburg Government prepared to annex Galicia and Bukovina long before the war of 1914, in order to wipe out 'Mazeppism'. When, in 1914, at the beginning of World War I, a Ukrainian delegation visited Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov to protest against the new prohibition of the Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire, the Minister replied cynically:

"Now the time has come to put an end to your Ukrainian movement once for all . . .".

727 The suppression of the Ukrainian movement was one of the main
661 aims of Tsarist Russian policy in World War I. The occupation of Galicia and Bukovina by the Russian armies in 1914-1917 brought heavy damage to the Ukrainian movement; the Ukrainian schools, press, co-operative societies, scientific and educational institutions
727 were destroyed. Thousands of Ukrainians, Austrian citizens, were
659 deported to Siberia. In the occupied territories a ruthless Russifica-
661 tion was started, and in Galicia the forced conversion of the Greek-

Catholic Ukrainians to Greek Orthodoxy was taking place. The Ukrainian Metropolitan of the Greek-Catholic Church in Galicia, Count Andrew Szeptycki, was arrested and deported to the interior of Russia, and with him numerous Ukrainian clergymen. This policy of oppression of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina was cynically referred to by the Russian Government as 'liberation of subjugated Slav brethren' . . .

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871 every teacher in the schools in Ukraine had orders to spread Com-
650 munist propaganda, to fight the appearance of national discontent with the Russian rule by every means, and was obliged to insult the
[814] struggle of the Ukrainian people for liberation. In schools, Ukrainian history was falsely interpreted as well as in literature and in films. For instance, clinging to the tradition taken from Tsarist Russia, the Hetman of Ukraine Ivan Mazeppa who at the beginning of the 18th century wanted to free Ukraine from Muscovite dependence, has in Soviet historiography the epithet of a 'traitor' and 'reactionary'. But Tsar Peter I. and Tsar Ivan the Terrible, are glorified by Soviet school and science as 'progressive democratic rulers'.

659 The Ukrainian religious life under the régime of Soviet Russian
661 occupation had to suffer from special persecutions. In 1921, in Soviet Ukraine the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Autocephal Church, independent of the Moscow Patriarch, was organised. This Church, headed by its idealistic leaders, the Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former Premier of the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1918—19 and others, completed a great task for the cultural and moral improvement of the Ukrainian nation. Moscow attempted to destroy the strong organisation of the Ukrainian Autocephal Church with the help of its agents, but did not succeed in this. Then the Soviet Government ruined by bloody repressions the Ukrainian Church after having destroyed its entire hierarchy and masses of its followers (1929).

661 In connection with the 'General Line' which had placed unbear-
517 able burdens on Ukrainian economy, a mass discontent against Moscow increased among the Ukrainians. The ruthless economic
815 exploitation and political oppression by Russia caused, among the Ukrainian people, a permanent oppositon which appeared in various forms. Therefore, the Moscow Government decided to terrorise the Ukrainian intelligentsia which bore the brunt of the political efforts of the Ukrainian nation. For this purpose a number of trials against the most prominent representatives of Ukrainian science and social life were arranged; the case of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine with the participation of the prominent member of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, Serhy Yefremov, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former Premier, Professor Osyp Hermayze and others in Kharkov, in spring 1930. Thousands of innocent people, especially students, perished in the prisoners' cells of the GPU without any trial. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian Academy of Science was exposed to repressions. In place of the imprisoned or expelled members of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, the Communists appointed their own people though without scientific merits, but politically faithful to Moscow.

Ukrainian problem has remained from old times for Soviet Russia the basic problem of its internal and foreign policy. The unceasing Russification policy against the Ukrainians is carried on by particularly cunning methods: the Ukrainian language is not yet abolished definitely in the offices of Soviet Ukraine. But that official who speaks Ukrainian also in his family and in private relations becomes in the eyes of the Soviet authorities suspicious, and has to suffer repressions.

The Communist theory of the national problem worked out by Lenin preaches the 'fusion of nations'. Basing on this, the Russian Communist Government is trying to 'fuse' the nations of the Soviet Union with the Russians. Against peoples who oppose forced Russification, ruthless repressions are used by Moscow. Even the mentioning of the national rights of the non-Russian peoples is condemned in the USSR as 'bourgeois nationalism'.

There is a great principal difference between the situation of the Russians and the peoples united by force with this state: though the Russians are not satisfied with the Communist dictatorship, they do not, however, feel national oppression. Even in the new anthem of the USSR it is said that this state was rallied by Great Russia. We can state the efforts of Russian political groups opposing the Communist régime to maintain the rule of the Russian state over the territories conquered by Soviet Russia, even after the eventual fall of the Soviet régime.

As a curious fact we can quote the view of the well-known Communist L. Trotzky, who was assassinated in Mexico during World War II, on the Ukrainian problem. Trotzky demanded in 1939 the full separation of Ukraine from Russia. But Trotzky thought of an independent Ukraine in the form of a Soviet Republic. This naturally deprived his thesis of all seriousness, for Trotzky needed the slogan of an independent Ukraine only as a political argument in polemics against Stalin (*Bulletin of the Opposition*, No. 77/78, 1939).

As the facts prove, the Ukrainian nation has to endure the heaviest oppression in the USSR. Unfortunately, the words of the famous historian of France Charles Seignobos written in 1913 on Ukraine, can be used emphatically to describe the outstanding feature of the present state of the Ukrainian nation: "Here is the most oppressed nation" ("Voici la nation la plus opprimée", *Les Annales des Nationalités:* Paris, 1913).

In its equalising policy, the Soviet Russian Government retains, also, traces of the Tsarist régime in the affairs of Church and religion. Thus, after having seized Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine dur-

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

641 [562] Art. 102. Women in the Ukrainian SSR are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, State, cultural, social and political life.

The possibility of exercising these rights is ensured to women by granting them an equal right with men to work, payment for work, rest and leisure, social insurance and education and by State protection of the interests of mother and child, State aid to mothers of large families and unmarried mothers, maternity leave with full pay and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens.

[563] Art. 103. Equality of rights of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR, irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, State, cultural, social and political life, is an indefeasible law.

Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their race or nationality and also any propagation of racial or national exclusiveness, hatred and contempt - are punishable by law.

[564] Art. 104. In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the Ukrainian SSR is separated from the State and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.

Art. 105. In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are guaranteed by law:

(a) Freedom of speech;
(b) Freedom of the press;
(c) Freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings;
(d) Freedom of street processions and demonstrations.

These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights.

[575] Art. 106. In conformity with the interests of the working people and in order to develop the organizational initiative and political activity of the masses of the people, citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are ensured the right to unite in public organizations — trade unions, co-operative associations, youth organizations, sport and defence organizations, cultural, technical and scientific societies; and the most active and politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and State.

[594] Art. 107. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are guaranteed inviolability of the person. No person may be placed under arrest except by decision of a court or with the sanction of a procurator.

Art. 108. The inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence are protected by law.

Art. 109. The Ukrainian SSR affords the right of asylum to foreign citizens persecuted for defending the interests of the working people, or for their scientific activities, or for their struggle for national liberation.

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Thus in Russia itself the 'Uniate heresy' was liquidated and it survived only in the Ukrainian territories which until 1918 belonged to the Austrian Empire and after 1918 to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania. It was only after the final establishment of the Soviet power in Lvov, the see of the Ukrainian Uniate Metropolitan, that the great historical opportunity presented itself of accomplishing the work of Catherine II and Nicholas I with regard to the Uniate Church.

Soviet interference in Ukrainian church affairs proceeded as follows. In April 1945 the Metropolitan Slepoy, four bishops and several priests of the Uniate Church, all opponents of Orthodoxy and faithful supporters of the Pope were arrested as 'accomplices of German occupants'. One month later a 'Central Initiative Group for Reunion of the Greek Catholic Church with the Orthodox Church' was formed and in April 1946 a Synod in Lvov solemnly proclaimed the union of the two churches. Considering the conditions prevailing in Russia the 'initiative group' could not have been set up, nor could the Lvov Synod be summoned without the active support of the Soviet authorities, and particularly of the 'Plenipotentiary for Religious Affairs of the Ukrainian S.S.R.'. The decisions of the Lvov Synod were not accepted by a number of parish priests who despite official pressure refused to abandon the Uniate Church. By January 1948 the resistance, according to official Soviet reports, seemed on the whole to be broken.

The Synod of Lvov was an ecclesiastical event only in name. In reality its decisions constituted a victory of the Russian State over Western tendencies in a frontier territory and the Orthodox Church was nothing but the accidental instrument by the help of which the victory was achieved. The Synod was merely an episode in the repression of the Western influences which after the end of the Second World War challenged Bolshevism in almost every sphere of Ukrainian life.[17]

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

Apart from receiving additional strength from the Western Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalism of the war and post-war period derived inspiration from two diametrically opposed sources. On the one hand, Ukrainian nationalism was encouraged under the German occupation. Without granting to the Ukrainian people the slightest shadow of an independent status, the German occupants favoured and consolidated the negative anti-Russian and anti-Jewish features of Ukrainian nationalism.

On the other hand, official Soviet propaganda also gave a fresh impetus to Ukrainian nationalism by allowing some expression to Ukrainian national hero-worship, for instance, by the creation of a war decoration commemorating the popular Ukrainian Cossack Hetman